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11 Introduction
Economists and states have long been interested in the relationship between ￿nancial
development and economic growth, and promoting ￿nancial development has been an
integral part of many countries￿growth strategies. A body of literature since the work of
King and Levine (1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) has found a positive link between
￿nancial development and growth, yet Levine (2004), reviewing the empirical literature,
cautions that available evidence su⁄ers from ￿serious shortcomings,￿and that ￿we are far
from de￿nitive answers to the questions: Does ￿nance cause growth, and if so, how?￿A
critical impediment to a better understanding of this relationship is the lack of exogenous
variation in variables of interest: the literature has relied primarily on evidence from
cross-country comparisons.
This paper uses a policy experiment in India to evaluate the e⁄ect of government own-
ership of banks on ￿nancial and economic development. In 1980, the government of India
nationalized all private banks with a deposit base above Rs. 2 billion, leaving comparable,
but smaller, banks in private hands. Because the 1980 nationalization induced variation
in the share of credit issued by public banks across credit markets in India, I am able to
identify the causal e⁄ect of bank nationalization on economic outcomes. Credit markets
with more nationalized banks lent more to government-targeted borrowers (agricultural
and rural), had lower interest rates, and initially experienced faster ￿nancial development.
This came at the cost of lower quality intermediation, and the increased pace of ￿nan-
cial development was not maintained in the 1990s. Most strikingly, despite substantial
increases in agricultural credit, there is no evidence of improved agricultural outcomes in
markets with nationalized banks. Bank nationalization may have slowed the growth of
employment in the more developed sectors of trade and services.
Government ownership of banks is common and pervasive, among the most important
policy tools used to in￿ uence ￿nancial development. La Porta et al. (2002) calculate
that in countries around the world the average share of equity of the ten largest banks
held by governments was 42 percent in 1995. In socialist countries, proponents of na-
2tionalization argued that economic planning required control of the banks (e.g., Lenin,
Gershenkron, etc.). But even those who favored market-based systems found reasons to
support public ownership of banks: government intervention in rural areas could both mo-
bilize deposits and improve the lives of the poor; credit market failures and lender moral
hazard problems were severe enough that regulation alone was felt insu¢ cient; and some
feared monopolistic behavior in the industrial credit market could limit entry. Proponents
of nationalization succeeded in both developing and developed economies.
A small recent literature tests these hypotheses. La Porta et. al. (2002) estimate
cross-country regressions, ￿nding government ownership of banks negatively correlated
with ￿nancial development and growth. Sapienza (2004) and Khwaja and Mian (2004)
use micro-level data to compare public and private sector banks in Italy and Pakistan,
respectively. Sapienza ￿nds that public sector banks lend at lower interest rates, and
with a bias towards poorer areas, compared to private banks, and that some lending
appears to be politically motivated. Khwaja and Mian ￿nd that government-owned banks
are more likely than private banks to lend to ￿rms whose directors or executives have
political a¢ liation, and less likely to collect on these loans. Two recent papers show that
government bank lending varies with the electoral cycle. Dinc (2005), using evidence
from 36 countries, shows that government banks lend more, relative to private banks,
in election years. Cole (2006) demonstrates that government-owned banks in India are
subject to substantial government capture, lending more in election years, and targeting
these loans to ￿close￿constituencies.
Indeed, it may even be that both theories are right: government ownership leads to
capture and ine¢ ciency, but also cures market failures. In this case, the desirability of
government banks hinges crucially on the real e⁄ects of ownership.
Both the cross-country and micro-studies are valuable, but su⁄er short-comings. Causal
interpretation of La Porta et. al. (2002) results is di¢ cult: they ￿nd government owner-
ship of banks correlated with many other factors thought to in￿ uence economic growth,
such as state intervention in the economy, and marginal tax rates. Including either of
3these measures in the cross-country growth regression renders the coe¢ cient on govern-
ment ownership of banks statistically indistinguishable from zero. Existing micro studies
are vulnerable to two limitations: ￿rst, government ownership of banks is not random,
and government banks may operate under di⁄erent regulations, in di⁄erent areas, etc.,
than private banks, rendering a comparison of outcomes di¢ cult. Second, comparing pub-
lic to private banks confound ownership e⁄ects with market e⁄ects. If public banks are
found to have higher loan default rates, for example, this may be due to ownership of the
bank, or because di⁄erent types of ￿rms choose to borrow from public vs. private banks,
or because ￿rms that borrow from both public and private banks prefer to default from
public banks. Much of the present paper compares credit markets whose banks are 100
percent government-owned to those whose banks are entirely privately held.
By combining credit data with real outcomes, this paper adds to a small set of studies
that use plausibly exogenous variation in ￿nancial development to study the e⁄ect of
￿nancial development on the real economy. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), examines the
e⁄ects of relaxing branch licensing requirements in the United States, ￿nding that the
resulting ￿nancial development increased growth rates. Burgess and Pande (2005) study
the Indian government￿ s requirement that all banks (public and private) open branches
in rural areas, which increased the number of rural branches from 105 to 29,109 over a
13-year period. The expansion was driven by a policy rule, and generated trend breaks in
￿nancial development, which are used to identify the e⁄ects on poverty. The study ￿nds
that the expansion of credit signi￿cantly reduced poverty in rural areas, while having no
e⁄ect on poverty in urban areas. Burgess, Pande and Wong (2005) provide evidence that
the branch expansion increased lending to the poor, particularly for low caste groups.
The richness of data available in the present study provides a comprehensive picture
of the e⁄ect of ownership on lending behavior. In particular, I measure whether na-
tionalization achieved ￿social￿goals of the government. By focusing on India, I avoid
interpretation problems associated with cross-country regressions. This study is indeed
useful to compare results obtained from a cross-country style approach with causal esti-
4mates. Because the nationalization occurred according to a strict policy rule, and because
public and private banks face identical regulation, di⁄erences in lending behavior and out-
comes can be attributed to bank ownership, rather than characteristics of the bank (such
as whether the bank was founded to lend to a particular sector, or faces di⁄erent regula-
tion). A drawback of this setting is that, because banks were nationalized according to
their deposit base, the ￿ treated￿banks are signi￿cantly larger than the ￿ control￿banks.
Directly related is the debate on the merits of state ownership of any enterprise. Ad-
vocates believe that government ownership can solve market failures and enhance equity.
Opponents worry that the soft incentives typically faced by public sector employees lead
to ine¢ ciency, and that public enterprises are subject to political capture. This is a vital
question, yet there is relatively little careful empirical evidence on this issue.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe the Indian bank nation-
alization in detail, and discuss the data. Section 2.3 examines the e⁄ect of bank ownership
on bank performance, compares the costs of government assistance to private banks to
the cost of assistance to public banks, and describes how nationalization a⁄ected sectoral
allocation of credit at the bank level. Section 3 links bank ownership to ￿nancial devel-
opment employment, and investment, by comparing credit markets whose bank branches
were nationalized to outcomes in towns whose branches were not nationalized. I then
conclude.
2 Indian Bank Nationalization and Data
2.1 Bank Nationalization
Formal banking in India dates back to at least the 18th century, with the founding of the
English Agency Houses. Private and regional government banks followed, and by the time
of independence in 1947, there were over ￿fty banks operating over 1,500 bank branches in
India. In 1969, in the context of nationalization of several key industries, the government
nationalized all banks whose nationwide deposits were greater than Rs. 500 million. This
5resulted in the nationalization of 14 banks, or 54 percent of the branches in India at that
time.
Prakash Tandon, a former chairman of the Punjab National Bank (nationalized in
1969), described in 1989 the rationale for nationalization as follows:
Many bank failures and crises over two centuries, and the damage they did
under ￿ laissez faire￿conditions; the needs of planned growth and equitable dis-
tribution of credit, which in privately owned banks was concentrated mainly
on the controlling industrial houses and in￿ uential borrowers; the needs of
growing small scale industry and farming regarding ￿nance, equipment and
inputs; from all these there emerged an inexorable demand for banking legis-
lation, some government control and a central banking authority, adding up,
in the ￿nal analysis, to social control and nationalization.1
Concurrent with nationalization, the Indian government sought to increase the geo-
graphic reach of the banking system. Prior to 1969, banks had grown organically, branch-
ing out from the place of their founding. This growth rarely included rural areas. The
1970s saw a tremendous growth in branch banking, driven primarily by a government
directive that banks serve rural areas. This directive, which went into e⁄ect in 1977, was
enforced through a licensing requirement: for every branch a bank opened in a location
that already had a bank branch, a bank was required to open four branches in unbanked
areas. The government assigned districts ￿ lead banks,￿which could be either public or
private, and typically already operated in or near the district. These banks were charged
which coordinated branch expansion in the district. The lead bank selected locations
for new branches, and then negotiated with other banks over which banks would open
branches in which locations. In 1980, 52 percent of the towns which were served by only
one branch owed their branch to expansion in the period 1977-1980. (Desai, 1987) The
fact that the expansion locations were selected using the same criteria in each district
suggests that, within a given district, the villages into which di⁄erent banks expanded
were similar.
6In April of 1980, the government undertook a second round of nationalization, placing
under government control the six private banks whose nationwide deposits were above
Rs. 2 billion, or a further 8 percent of bank branches (6 percent of India-wide aggregate
deposits and credit), leaving approximately 10 percent of bank branches (9 percent of
aggregate deposits and credit) in private hands. This decree, issued by Indira Gandhi, was
one of her ￿rst acts upon resuming the o¢ ce of prime minister in 1980. The nationalization
was implemented under the same legislative framework, with similar stated goals: ￿in order
to further control the economy, to meet progressively and serve better the needs of the
development of the economy and to promote the welfare of the people.￿(Desai, 1987, p.
123).
The ranking of private banks, in terms of size, remained fairly constant following the
￿rst nationalization. Of the six banks that were nationalized in 1980, all but one had
been among the six largest banks in 1970. The exception, Punjab and Sindh Bank, was
number 11 in 1970, pushed Bank of Rajasthan (number 6 in 1970) out of the top 6.
The nationalized banks remained corporate entities, retaining most of their sta⁄, with
the exception of members of the board of directors, who were replaced by appointees
of the central government. The political appointments included representatives from the
government, industry, agriculture, as well as the public.
Nationalization was accompanied by a series of government regulations that sought to
a⁄ect lending decisions. The government enacted ￿ priority sector￿targets, which required
banks to lend a certain share of credit to agriculture, small-scale industry, and other
sectors. Banks that fell short of this target were required to lend the amount of the
shortfall to the government at penalty (very low) rates.
Other government regulations limited interest rates, particularly for small loans, until
the early 1990s. Beginning in the early 1990s, ￿nancial liberalization led to freeing of
lending and deposit rates, greater bank autonomy, increased entry, and lower reserve
requirements. (Reddy, 1998) All of these regulations, throughout the period of study,
applied equally to public and private sector banks.
7Between the 1969 nationalization and 2000, there were twenty-one private bank failures
in India. Banerjee, Cole, and Du￿ o (2005) ￿nd that the cost to the government of making
whole depositors in these failed banks was less than the cost of recapitalizing public sector
banks (appropriately scaled). Dinc and Brown (2005) demonstrate that bank failures are
very common worldwide, and political concerns a⁄ect the timing and costliness of bailouts.
2.2 Data
A major strength of this study is the richness and scope of banking data collected by
the Reserve Bank of India. The ￿Basic Statistical Returns-2￿contains information on
bank lending. Each year, every bank branch in India is required to provide information
on every loan in its portfolio to the Reserve Bank of India. This information includes the
size of the loan, interest rate, and performance status, as well as various characteristics
of the borrower, including industry (at the three-digit level), rural/urban status, etc.2
The analyses in this paper are therefore based on a census, rather than sample, of loans
in India. Finally, this is the only study of which I am aware that examines the sectoral
allocation of credit, and the resultant implications for real economic outcomes.
The analysis covers over 2,400 banking markets of varying size. A potential di¢ culty
in determining the e⁄ects of bank ownership on outcomes is the joint presence of public
and private banks: private banks could, for example, make up for public bank de￿ciencies.
Part of this study focuses on the 1,500 markets with only one branch, which allows me to
measure the e⁄ects of going from 100 percent private ownership to 100 percent government
ownership.
Data on bank branch locations, used to compute the market share of public and private
banks in 1980, is from a directory of commercial banks, published by the RBI in 2000,
which gives the opening (and closing) date of every bank branch in India, and indicates
in which credit market each branch is located (Reserve Bank of India, 2000).
Annual aggregate deposit and credit data, by branch, are available from 1981-2000.
These data are used to evaluate the e⁄ect of nationalization on the ￿nancial development,
8and to control for initial conditions when evaluating the outcomes.
Data on bank balance sheets is also from the Reserve Bank of India: various issues of
the ￿Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India￿(1963-1970) and ￿Banking Statistics￿
(1972-2000).
A ￿nal advantage of the data used by this paper is that much of the analysis is at
the level of the village (or town), making for particularly compelling identi￿cation: while
nationalization of the parent banks was a function of their size, there is no mechanical
relationship between the size of a bank branch at the village level, and nationalization.3
A limitation is that there are no datasets with information on ￿rm productivity at the
town level: thus I am unable to answer questions about ￿rm performance.
The Appendix Table gives summary statistics.
2.3 Nationalization and Bank Performance
Identi￿cation Strategy
Comparing nationalized to non-nationalized banks in India is a promising approach
to establish the causal relationship between ￿nancial development and bank ownership:
exploiting within-country variation avoids many of the problems of cross-country regres-
sions. Because the Indian bank nationalization followed a strict policy rule, it is unlikely
that just the better (or worse)-performing banks were nationalized: there is no evidence
to suggest the cut-o⁄ was chosen strategically, and because the policy was a surprise,
banks would not have had the opportunity to ￿game￿the cut-o⁄ criterion.
This identi￿cation strategy is most credible when it focuses on banks just above, and
just below the cut-o⁄. I de￿ne as ￿marginal￿the group of banks that were closest to the
size cut-o⁄: this group includes the ￿ve smallest private banks that were nationalized,
and the 18 largest private banks that were not. (Eighteen was chosen because the total
assets of those 18 are approximately equal to the assets of the ￿ve smallest nationalized
banks.4) This paper will focus exclusively on these ￿marginal￿banks. While these are the
banks closest to the cuto⁄, there is still substantial variation in size: the average deposit
9book of a nationalized ￿ marginal￿bank was 3.7 billion Rupees, while the mean for non-
nationalized ￿ marginal￿banks was 732 million Rupees. Figure 1 gives the distribution of
bank sizes as of 1979. Each bar represents a single bank: they are ordered from smallest
to largest. The six in black are those that were nationalized in 1980. Banks to the right
were nationalized prior to 1980, while banks on the left were and remain private.
The identi￿cation strategy rests on the assumption that, conditional upon size, na-
tionalized and non-nationalized banks are not materially di⁄erent. This is a testable
hypothesis: Table 1 compares the average size of deposits, number of branches, pro￿ts,
deposits per branch, and return on equity of the nationalized and non-nationalized banks.
Column (3) gives the p-value for a test of the di⁄erence in means. The banks that were
to be nationalized were substantially larger (both deposits and number of branches), and
had greater pro￿ts. However, once variables are scaled by bank size, there is no sta-
tistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between the private and nationalized banks: the amount
of deposits per branch, and the return on equity for nationalized and non-nationalized
banks are indistinguishable. This is shown by running the following regression (where
yb;79 indicates bank b outcome in 1979), Nationalizedb is a dummy indicating whether
bank b was nationalized:
yb;79 = ￿ + ￿ ￿ Nationalized + " (1)
Columns (4), (5), and (6) add to the equation a one-, two-, and three-order polynomial in
the log-size of the bank￿ s deposits in 1979. The p-value of the test ￿ = 0 is reported for
each variable and each speci￿cation. A linear control for size renders ￿ insigni￿cant for
all variables in the comparison between nationalized and non-nationalized banks. This
provides some evidence in support of the identi￿cation strategy. However, an important
limitation is the relatively low number of banks: with only 23 banks, there is limited
statistical power to test the identifying assumption.
Bank Growth
Standard measures of bank performance, such as the return on equity, are of limited
value in the Indian context, where accounting standards have historically been lax. To
10determine whether public ownership of banks inhibits ￿nancial intermediation, I compare
the growth rates of the banks that were just above and below the 1980 nationalization
cut-o⁄, using data from the Reserve Bank of India, for the period 1969 to 2000.
I regress the annual change in bank deposits, credit, and number of bank branches
on a dummy for post nationalization (Eightiest=1 if the year is between 1980 and 1991),
and a dummy for nationalization in a liberalized environment (Ninetiest = 1 if the year is
between 1992 and 2000), as well as a dummy for whether a particular bank was nation-
alized (Natb). I split the post-nationalization period into two periods because the former
period was characterized by continued ￿nancial repression, while substantial liberalization
began in the early 1990s. Bank size may a⁄ect bank growth rates, I therefore include the
deposits of the bank as of December 31, 1979, g(Kb;80) = ￿0Kb;80.5 The regression thus
measures whether the growth rates of nationalized banks were di⁄erent from those of non-
nationalized banks in three di⁄erent periods: before nationalization, after nationalization
in the 1980s, and the 1990s. The estimated equation is:
ln(yb;t=yb;t￿1) = ￿ + g (Kb;80) + ￿ ￿ Natb + ￿1 ￿ Eightiest + ￿2 ￿ Ninetiest + (2)
￿1 (Eightiest ￿ Natb) + ￿2 (Ninetiest ￿ Natb) + "b;t
The parameters of interest are ￿; ￿1 and ￿2. The ￿rst (￿) measures whether the
banks that were nationalized in 1980 grew at a di⁄erent rate than non-nationalized banks
before the 1980 nationalization, while ￿1 and ￿2 test for di⁄erential growth rates after
nationalization. Standard errors are adjusted for auto-correlation within each bank.
Table 2 presents the results for growth in credit and deposits. As mentioned in section
2.3, an identi￿cation assumption crucial to this analysis is that prior to nationalization,
nationalized and non-nationalized banks were similar. The ￿rst line of column (3) in each
panel of Table 2 reports the estimate of ￿ for measures of deposit and credit growth rates
prior to nationalization. There were no pre-existing di⁄erences in bank growth rates prior
to nationalization: the estimated value of ￿ for deposits and credit is .04, indistinguishable
from zero.
11Following nationalization, the overall rate of growth in deposits and credit slowed sub-
stantially for all banks, but there was no di⁄erential e⁄ect for nationalized and private
banks. (The estimated e⁄ects of nationalization are -.05 and -.04, not statistically dis-
tinguishable from zero.) In the nineties, deposit and credit growth slowed further still.
Moreover, in this liberalized environment, nationalization had an e⁄ect on growth rates:
deposits grew 8 percent more slowly, and credit 9 percent slower, in nationalized marginal
banks, relative to non-nationalized marginal banks. These estimates are signi￿cant at the
￿ve percent level.
A more ￿ exible speci￿cation would allow bank size to a⁄ect growth rates di⁄er-
entially: that is, it would allow variation in credit to depend on bank size di⁄eren-
tially in each decade. I estimate equation (2), but replace g(Kb;80) with three terms:
Seventiest ￿g (Kb;80); Eightiest ￿g (Kb;80); and Ninetiest ￿g (Kb;80): The bottom two pan-
els of Table 2 present results from this regression. Once one includes these more ￿ exible
controls, there is no evidence of di⁄erential growth rates between nationalized and non-
nationalized banks. The point estimates are close to zero, but with wider con￿dence
intervals.
The results thus present suggestive evidence that nationalization a⁄ected growth rates,
but the results are not robust to the alternative speci￿cation. The di⁄erential e⁄ect in
the 1990s vs. the 1980s observed in Panel A may re￿ ect the changing nature of banking
in India. During the 1980s, it was relatively di¢ cult for banks to compete: both lending
and deposit rates were set by the RBI, and branch expansion was primarily limited to
rural, unbanked locations. The 1990s saw the freeing of both lending and deposit rates,
and allowed banks to expand where they would ￿nd it most pro￿table.
123 The E⁄ect of Ownership on Credit Market Out-
comes
So far, I have demonstrated that nationalized banks grew less quickly than private banks
in the 1990s, and described evidence that they lent more to agriculture, rural areas, and
the government, at the expense of credit to trade, transport, and ￿nance. This does
not, however, necessarily imply that nationalization has had a substantial impact on real
outcomes: private banks could have met the growing economy￿ s need for credit, and the
di⁄erences in sectoral lending could merely represent specialization (or ￿crowding out￿ )
of credit by banks in areas in which they have a comparative advantage. I therefore focus
on outcomes at the credit-market level.
A simple approach, analogous to cross-country analysis, would be to regress the out-
come of interest in credit market c in 2000 on the share of branches that were government-
owned in 1980, PubShare1980; and additional control variables Xc.
yc;1992 = ￿d + ￿ ￿ Pubshare1980 + ￿Xc + "c (3)
However, this approach will not be valid if, as is likely to be the case, Pubshare1980 is
correlated with other factors that a⁄ect yc;1992 that are not included in X. It is therefore
di¢ cult to causally interpret ￿￿this is the major weakness of cross-country analysis.
In the remainder of the paper, I exploit the fact that the 1980 nationalization induced
variation across credit markets in the share of public banks. This allows the measure-
ment of the causal e⁄ect of nationalization, in a general equilibrium setting, on ￿nancial
development, credit markets, and real outcomes.
3.1 Identi￿cation Strategy and First Stage
Though much of India￿ s banking sector was nationalized in 1969, the banks that remained
private grew quickly, and by 1980, there were 47 private banks in India, operating 4,428
13branches. The median private bank in India was large, with 145 branches, and geograph-
ically diverse, operating in 118 distinct credit markets. Cities whose branches belonged
to banks just above the nationalization cut-o⁄ were exposed to more nationalized credit
than cities whose branches were just below the cut-o⁄: I exploit this variation to estimate
the causal impact of credit on economic outcomes.
The unit of observation in this section is a credit market. The Reserve Bank of India
de￿nes a credit market as an area in which someone could plausibly travel to visit a bank.
Each is typically a village, town or city. The number of banks (in 1980) in a credit market
range from zero (in many rural areas) to 972 (Mumbai or Bombay). The identi￿cation
strategy in this section is similar in spirit to the one used above. The sample includes
all credit markets that had at least one private bank prior to the 1980 nationalization, or
2,928 cities, villages and towns. Of these locations, 1,513 had only one branch, 465 had
two branches, 624 had from three to ten branches, and 232 had more than 10 branches.
The most straightforward analysis involves the 1,513 banking markets served by just
one branch, belonging to a marginal bank. All of these branches were private prior to the
1980 nationalization. In this case, a ￿regression-discontinuity￿ 6 design is suitable:
yc;d;92 = ￿ ￿ Nationalizedc + g (sizec;80) + h(depositsc;80) + ￿d + "c;t (4)
where Nationalizedc is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the branch in city c
belonged to a nationalized bank, sizec is the log deposits of the parent bank whose branch
was located in city c, and ￿d are district ￿xed-e⁄ects. Note that sizec is the total amount
of deposits of all branches of the bank in India, not deposits in the villages￿ s branch,
and that g(sizec;80) indicates a third-degree polynomial in size. It is of course possible
that additional branches opened up between 1980 and 1992, and these banks lending is
included in all outcome measures. Throughout the remainder of this paper, outcomes are
measured at the credit-market level.
It is important to emphasize that nationalization was assigned as a function of India-
wide bank deposits, rather than the size of particular branches. Figure 2 gives the size
distribution of the 1,513 credit markets which consisted of only one branch as of 1980:
14the distribution in village size are very similar, with almost identical support. While a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects equality of distribution of deposits between nationalized
and non-nationalized banks, once one conditions on the district in which the branch is lo-
cated, the di⁄erence in size between nationalized branches and non-nationalized branches
is not statistically signi￿cant.7 Since local levels of ￿nancial development may a⁄ect
outcomes independently of bank ownership, I include a third-degree polynomial term in
credit￿ market speci￿c log deposits in 1980, h(depositsc;80). Because outcomes may be
correlated across banks, the standard errors from equation (4) are clustered at the bank
level.
A di⁄erent approach is necessary to include larger towns and cities which had more
than one bank branch in 1980. The e⁄ect of nationalization would be picked up by
including the share of branches nationalized in the market in 1980. However, it is again
important to control for the fact that nationalized banks were in general larger than non-
nationalized branches. One can no longer use a regression-discontinuity style approach,
since the size of the banks in the credit market cannot be characterized by a single variable
(the size of the parent bank): rather, it is characterized by a distribution of sizes of parent
banks. One way to summarize this distribution would be to use the average size of parent
banks of marginal branches in that district. However, the distribution of banks may
matter: a city with two branches, one belonging to a large parent, and one to a small
parent, may grow in a di⁄erent way than a city with two branches belonging to medium-
sized banks. As it is not possible to include distribution functions as control variables, I
follow Chamberlain (1987) and approximate the density function by dividing banks into
four groups: large public banks (the State Bank of India and the set of banks that was
nationalized in 1969), large public banks nationalized in 1980, marginal banks (the small
public banks nationalized in 1980, and the large private banks not nationalized in 1980),
and small banks (all of which stayed private after 1980). Using the same de￿nition of
marginal as in section 2.3 gives the following three variables for each credit market c in
15year 1980:
SmallSharec;80 = Small banks market share (none nationalized in 1980)
MargSharec;80 = Marginal bank market share (some nationalized in 1980; others not)
LargeSharec;80 = Large bank market share (all nationalized in 1980)
Market share is measured by the number of bank branches, as credit data from 1980 are
not available. The omitted category is large public sector banks. To measure the e⁄ect
of nationalization on outcomes at the city level, I include an interaction term MargNatc;
which is de￿ned as MargNatc = (MargSharec) ￿ (Nationalizedc), where Nationalizedc
is the share of marginal branches in city c that were nationalized. This gives the following
regression:
Yc;d;92 = ￿ + ￿sSmallSharec;80 + ￿mMargSharec;80 + ￿lLargeSharec;80 (5)
+￿MargNatc;80+￿ ￿ avsizec + ￿d + "c;d;92
The parameters ￿s;￿m,￿l, and ￿ allow outcomes to vary with the size and distribution
of banks operating in the district. The e⁄ect of nationalization is measured by ￿; the coef-
￿cient on the interaction term. A simple example may be illustrative: suppose a town had
two branches each from small, marginal, and large bank groupings, and that of these six
branches, one was nationalized in 1980. Then SmallSharec;80 =MargSharec;80 =LargeSharec;80 =
1
3: The term MargNat=1
6; and indicates the share of branches nationalized in the town.8
Equation (5) is estimated using data from 2,443 credit markets, which I refer to as the
￿All-India￿sample.
This section answers two related questions. First, how does the elimination of private
banks, through the nationalization of all branches, a⁄ect economic outcomes? This can be
measured by estimating equation (4) on the sample of towns that had only one branch in
1980. The second question, on the e⁄ect of nationalizing bank branches in an environment
in which public credit may also be available, is answered by estimating equation (5) on
the ￿All-India￿sample.
16The ￿rst-stage results are presented in Table 3. The dependent variable is share of
credit in the town issued by public sector banks (both nationalized and state banks).
Column (1) gives the results from equation (4), which includes the 1,513 towns and
villages that, just prior to the 1980 nationalizations, had one private bank branch and no
public branches. Not surprisingly, the nationalization dummy predicts very well the share
of credit from public banks, with a point estimate of 1.00 and a standard error of .02.
The R2 of the equation is .97; it is not one because in some villages, additional branches
opened after 1980. Standard errors are clustered by parent bank.
Column (2) presents results from equation (5) for all cities, which, as of 1980, had at
least one branch belonging to a ￿marginal￿bank. As before, if the share of credit had
been frozen over time at a level equal to the share of branches in 1980, the coe¢ cient
on MargNat would be exactly one.9 The point estimate in column (2) is indeed exactly
one, with a standard error of .01. Because the coe¢ cients for the ￿rst stage for all
three speci￿cations are one, the subsequent analysis presents reduced form, rather than
instrumental variable estimates. (In the reduced form, the outcome variable of interest
takes the place of Yc in equations (4) and (5), respectively). Standard errors in this
speci￿cation are clustered by district.
In summary, the ￿rst stage is very strong: there is a tight relationship between branch
nationalization in 1980 and share of credit issued by public-sector banks in 1992. This
stasis is due to the heavy regulations concerning the opening of new branches, and the
similar aggregate growth between public and private banks in the 1980s. The remainder
of the paper examines the impact of nationalization on credit market and real outcomes.
3.2 Validity of the Identi￿cation Strategy
The present setting o⁄ers some signi￿cant advantages over previous work, which has
relied on variation whose source is not well understood. In India, public and private banks
operated in an identical legal environment, were subject to the same regulations, and were
governed by the same set of institutions. While the Indian bank nationalization was not
17randomly assigned, it was based on an observable criterion (size), and not pro￿tability,
region of operation, or expected growth rates.
The banks had wide-ranging, overlapping branch networks. Many of the branches
recently set up in rural areas were done so because of the government￿ s branch licensing
requirement, which obliged banks to open four branches in previously unbanked location
for every branch a bank opened in a banked location. The government provided the same
directives to public and private banks regarding where to open these branches.
The setting helps overcome two potential pitfalls in observational studies. First, one
might be concerned that the nationalized banks operated in regions that were subject to
di⁄erent economic opportunities or shocks than the areas in which non-nationalized banks
operated. The density of the branch network allows inclusion of a district ￿xed-e⁄ect, and
the analysis thus exploits variation only within districts. Administrative districts (the
unit below state) are relatively small, and 340 are represented in the dataset.
Second, one might be concerned that variation in initial conditions within the district
a⁄ects subsequent performance. The richness of the data and the large sample size allows
for non-parametric controls of the level of initial ￿nancial development in 1980.
Despite these advantages, there are some limitations. First, the study includes only
6 nationalized banks and 18 banks that remained private. While the standard errors in
speci￿cation 4 are corrected for clustering at the bank level, this limitation should be
kept in mind. Second, there are signi￿cant data limitations. There are no data on ￿rm
outcomes. The highest quality data is undoubtedly the credit data, but only branch-level
aggregate data on deposits and credit are available in 1980. Sector-level data, and data
on loan defaults, are available only starting in the 1990s. Thus, while it would be desirable
to conduct all analyses on changes rather than levels, this is only possible for credit and
deposit growth, and a limited number of variables from the census.10
Appendix Table A2 tests the identi￿cation strategy, using the data that is available
from 1981. The ￿rst row tests whether the level of credit varied at the credit-market
level, even without controls for the parent bank size. Column (1) reports results from a
18regression of credit in 1981 in all one-branch towns on a dummy for whether the branch
in that town was nationalized, including only district ￿xed-e⁄ects as a control. The point
estimate is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Column (2) presents results from
a regression of log credit in 1981 on SmallShare, MargShare, LargeShare, and MargNat,
again including district ￿xed-e⁄ects, but not average size of parent bank, as controls.
Panel B of the column presents falsi￿cation exercises, using the identi￿cation strate-
gies described in equations (4) and (5), for the set of variables available from the 1981
census. There is no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence in the level of credit, or the share
of individuals engaged as agricultural workers, cultivators, in small-scale industry, or in
literacy rates. While the standard errors are not as small as might be desired, the results
do suggest that there were not systematic di⁄erences between ￿ treated￿and ￿ control￿credit
markets.
3.3 Financial Development
A major goal of nationalization was to increase the scope and scale of banking in rural
areas. It was hoped this would mobilize deposits, as government banks would have lower
minimum balance requirements. The government also sought to increase the growth rate
of rural credit by shifting the portfolio allocations of nationalized banks.
To compare the results using the natural experiment to those obtained from OLS,
I ￿rst estimate the relationship between government ownership of banks and ￿nancial
development using equation (3). As a measure of ￿nancial development, I use the annual
log growth rate of deposits and credit, in each credit market, over the period 1981 to
2000. Because there are no time-varying regressors, I estimate the equation using average
annual cross-sectional growth (e.g., log (y1990=y1981)=9)), rather than a panel, to avoid
potential problems with serial correlation.
The e⁄ects of nationalization on ￿nancial development are estimated using equations 4
and 5. As a measure of ￿nancial development, I use the annual log growth rate of deposits
and credit, in each credit market, over the period 1981 to 2000. Because the e⁄ects of
19nationalization may be di⁄erent under di⁄erent regulatory regimes, I consider three time
periods: the entire period (1981-2000), the time of ￿￿nancial repression,￿(1981-1990), and
a time of ￿nancial liberalization (1991-2000). Because there are no time-varying regressors,
I estimate the equation using cross-sectional growth (e.g., log (y2000=y1981)=19)), rather
than a panel of annual growth rates, to avoid potential problems with serial correlation.
Results are presented in Table 4. Panel A presents results for the entire time period,
1981-2000. For smaller towns (which had only one branch in 1980), bank nationaliza-
tion appears to have had no e⁄ect on the overall speed of ￿nancial development. The
impact of nationalization on deposits is precisely estimated at zero; the e⁄ect on credit is
three percent, though not statistically distinguishable from zero. The all-India estimates
controlling for average size of the parent banks of marginal branches, gives an e⁄ect of
nationalization of 1 percent more credit, signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level. These re-
sults contrast sharply with the OLS statistics, which ￿nd a strong negative relationship
between government ownership and ￿nancial development.
Panel B restricts attention to the growth rate from 1981-1990, and ￿nds a quite dif-
ferent result: towns whose branch was nationalized experienced an annual growth rate of
credit approximately 2-3 percentage points higher than areas whose branches were not
nationalized. Moreover, credit grew in areas in which branches were nationalized by ap-
proximately 11 percentage points per year faster in villages, and 4-5 percentage points
faster for the all-India measures. This is a very large e⁄ect: over a nine-year period,
the amount of credit increased by a factor of 1.5-2.5 more in cities whose branches were
nationalized.
While credit grew much faster in the 1980s in areas with nationalized branches, this
e⁄ect does not represent a sustained increase. Panel C, which demonstrates how the
growth rate between 1991 and 2000 varied with nationalization, shows that nationalized
credit markets grew much less quickly from 1991 to 2000: the annual growth rate was
2-4 percent lower. By 1991 ￿ treated￿credit markets had been exposed to a decade of
nationalization, and were no longer comparable to ￿ non-treated￿credit markets: the results
20in Panel C should therefore not be given a causal interpretation. One possible explanation
may be that nationalized banks intentionally undid excessive expansion during the 1980s,
as they sought to compete in a more liberalized environment.11 A second possible cause
may be that banks reigned in lending as they faced a harder budget constraint in the
1990s, and regulatory environment that induced banks to shift assets away from lending
(Nag and Das, 2002). I conclude by noting that the wide divergence between the reduced
form and OLS estimates for the 1981-1990, and 1991-2000 period cast doubt on results
from cross-country analyses.
3.4 Lending
I now turn to how nationalization a⁄ected the composition and quality of lending in Indian
credit markets. Disaggregated credit data are available only beginning in 1992￿ thus,
the estimates in this section will necessarily be cross-sectional, rather than di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erence. All regressions continue to control for the initial level of ￿nancial development
in the credit market. Table 5 presents results for the share of credit lent by banks to
key sectors of the economy. For presentational clarity, only the coe¢ cients of interest￿
Nationalized for equation (4) and MargNat for (5)￿ are reported.
Nationalization was very successful at increasing the share of credit lent to agriculture.
For the sample of one-branch towns, the share of credit granted to agriculture was 26
percentage points higher in towns whose branch was nationalized than in towns whose
branch was not. (The average share of credit to agriculture in these locations was 38
percent.) For all India, the estimated e⁄ect is smaller, but still substantial: a 10 percent
increase in the share of public sector banks led to a more than one percentage point
increase in the share of credit going to agriculture. All e⁄ects are precisely estimated and
signi￿cant at the ￿ve or one percent level.
Not surprisingly, nationalization had no discernible e⁄ect on the share of rural credit
for towns with only one branch in 1980: these locations are classi￿ed by the RBI as rural,
and a full 86 percent of credit granted in these towns went to rural areas. The e⁄ect in the
21all-India estimates is, however, substantial. Nationalization of 10 percent of the branches
in a city had an e⁄ect of increasing the share to rural areas by one percentage point.
Nationalization was thus quite successful in causing banks to focus lending on rural
and agricultural areas. This was not the case for another primary goal of nationalization,
to increase the ￿ ow of credit to activities associated with economic development: the
estimated e⁄ect of nationalization on credit to small scale industry (a key priority ) and
large industry are precisely estimated at zero. Nor is there any e⁄ect on the share of
credit lent to trade and services.
What e⁄ect does ownership have on the price and quality of intermediation? Advocates
of social banking often argue that high interest rates in rural areas, charged either by
money lenders or a monopolistic bank, limit farmers￿ability to invest, and therefore
reduce agricultural output.
Interest rates in India are highly regulated, with concessionary rates mandated for
various types of loans (small loans, agricultural loans, etc.). To capture the discretionary
component of interest rates, I compute a ￿residual interest rate,￿which controls for loan
characteristics that determine interest rates. I regress the interest rate of each loan on a
wide range of control variables: an indicator for whether the borrower is in a small scale
industry, borrower industrial occupation dummies (at a three-digit level), district ￿xed
e⁄ects, size of loan, an indicator for whether the borrower is from the public or private
sector, and dummies indicating whether the loan is given in a rural, semi-urban, urban or
metropolitan area. Aggregating the residuals from this regression, at the credit market
level, gives a measure of interest rates that is independent of loan characteristics.
Table 6 suggests that when given a chance, public sector banks will lend at a lower
interest rate than private sector banks. Nationalization had no e⁄ect on interest rates
in 1992, though interest rates were heavily regulated prior to October 1994. Once rates
were deregulated, the presence of nationalized banks led to substantially lower interest
rates. The size of the e⁄ect is identical in both speci￿cations, and signi￿cant at the one
percent level. A town with a public branch would receive credit at an interest rate of 1.7
22percentage points lower than a town with a private sector bank. Note also that this is
not attributable to di⁄erences in the lending portfolios (e.g., riskiness of the industry of
the borrower) of public and private banks, since the residual interest rate was calculated
conditional on the industry of use and size of the loan. This is a substantial di⁄erence,
given that the interest rate at the time was around 15 percentage points, and is much
larger in magnitude than the e⁄ect estimated by Sapienza (2004) for Italy, who found that
government banks lent at rates approximately 20 to 50 basis points lower than private
banks. The lower interest rates charged by public sector banks in the 1990s may have
hindered their ability to grow, as the banks earned a lower return on their capital.
The second panel of Table 6 evaluates the quality of intermediation provided by banks,
as measured by the share of credit marked as late by more than six months in 1992. The
￿rst three columns of Table 6 use the share of non-agricultural credit that is reported as
at least six months late, while columns (4)-(6) give the e⁄ect for agricultural lending. The
estimated e⁄ect of nationalization is consistently positive. For non-agricultural credit in
the all-India sample, nationalized banks￿lending portfolios have a 4-5 percentage point
greater share of non-performing loans. For agricultural loans, the e⁄ect is even greater: 7
percentage points in the all-India sample, and 18 percentage points in one-branch towns.
The combination of higher default rates, and lower interest rates, especially for agricultural
credit, contributed to the balance sheet weakness in public sector banks in the 1990s.
The results provide some evidence in support of the development view of government
ownership of banks: nationalization resulted in substantially faster ￿nancial development
in the 1980s, lower interest rates, and shifted credit towards agriculture and rural areas.
However, the gains in credit were not sustained, as nationalized markets su⁄ered a severe
contraction in credit in the 1990s. Second, the quality of intermediation provided by
government banks was much lower: public sector loans were substantially more likely to
default than loans issued by private sector banks. This contributed to a substantial drain
on the public treasury, as the national government recapitalized these banks.
Strong evidence in favor of the political view is presented in Cole (2006). I demonstrate
23that there are agricultural lending booms prior to state elections, and that these lending
booms are targeted towards districts in which the majority party narrowly won or lost
the previous election.
Nationalization thus caused an increase in quantity, but lowered quality, of ￿nancial
intermediation. In the ￿nal section, I investigate how these credit market shocks a⁄ected
sectoral employment and agricultural investment: were the e⁄ects of increased quantity
greater or less than the costs of decreased quality?
4 Real Outcomes
This ￿nal section provides evidence on how bank ownership a⁄ects economic, rather than
￿nancial, development. A major challenge is data: the unit of analysis is the town (or
village), and the only data available at this level is census data. The towns must be
manually matched by name.12 Data on employment and agricultural investment from
the 1991 census were manually matched to the banking data, using the bank branch
addresses, as were data on employment from the 1981, 1991 and 2001 censuses. Of the
2393 credit markets in the banking data set, I was able to match 1,075 successfully to all
three censuses.13
The measures available in the census are not ideal￿ there is no information about ￿rms,
for example￿ but they do provide information on the e⁄ects of ownership on employment
and investment. Measures of economic development include share of male workers engaged
in the following activities: agricultural laborers, cultivators, household industry, formal
manufacturing, trade, and services (the latter three are available only for 1991). A greater
share of employees in the latter four sectors will be taken as evidence of greater economic
development. Agricultural laborers are landless laborers who work as sharecroppers or
for wages, while cultivators own their own land. Agricultural laborers are often very poor,
and a decline in their number could be taken as a sign of reduced inequality.14
Because agricultural credit was such an important part of the rationale for nationaliza-
24tion, a second data set, the 1991 census village abstracts, was matched to credit markets.
These data provide information about agricultural investment. Seven hundred and one
villages were matched to the set of villages with only one branch.15
Table 7 presents the results. The ￿rst three columns present the cross-sectional re-
lationship between nationalization and employment outcomes. The ￿rst column may be
taken as a test of the identi￿cation assumption, as the 1981 census data were collected
immediately after nationalization. The second and third columns give the cross-sectional
estimates of ten, and twenty, years of exposure to nationalized banks. The real outcome
data form a panel, and columns (4)-(6) present di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates of the
e⁄ect of nationalization. Equations (4) and (5), are estimated with changes, rather than
levels, as the dependent variable. Column (4) and (5) give ten year changes (1981-1991,
and 1991-2001), while column (6) gives the change in the dependent variable over a twenty
year period (1981-2001).
Column (1) suggests that the identifying assumption holds: the share of people em-
ployed in agriculture and small-scale industry in 1981 is not systematically di⁄erent be-
tween towns whose branch was nationalized and towns whose branch was not.
The ￿rst four rows present the e⁄ect of nationalization of banks on employment in agri-
culture. The point estimates in columns (2) and (3) are positive (and signi￿cant) suggest-
ing that nationalization, with its focus on credit to agriculture, may have slowed the de-
velopment process of exit from agriculture into other sectors. However, the cross-sectional
estimated e⁄ects (columns (2) and (3)) are only slightly larger than the pre-existing (but
not statistically signi￿cant) di⁄erences, and indeed the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates
in columns (4)-(6) do not provide evidence for a systematic e⁄ect.
A second main goal of nationalization was to promote employment in small-scale in-
dustries. Column (1) indicates there were no signi￿cant di⁄erences in small-scale industry
employment prior to nationalization. From 1981 to 1991 the level of credit lent by public
banks doubled relative to private sector banks, while the share directed to small-scale
industry did not change. Nevertheless, point estimates of the e⁄ect of nationalization
25on employment in small-scale industry are, across all speci￿cations and all time periods,
statistically indistinguishable from zero, and nearly everywhere estimated quite precisely
at zero.
As a ￿nal test of the e⁄ect of bank nationalization on employment, the bottom half of
Table 7 looks at the cross-sectional e⁄ect on employment in industry, trade and services.
These sectors are most associated with economic growth and ￿nancial development. The
point estimates that towns whose bank branch was nationalized had a substantially lower
share of employment in industry and trade. For the all-India sample (which includes cities
and towns), these estimates are statistically and economically signi￿cant, with a 10 percent
increase in the share of banks owned by the government leading to an approximately 0.2-
0.6 percent decline in industrial or trade employment. Unfortunately, data on employment
in these sectors are not available for 1981 or 2001, so it is not possible to estimate the
e⁄ect in changes.
What were the e⁄ects of the very large increase in credit to agriculture? The pres-
ence of tubewells, and the share of land irrigated are used as measures of investment.
These variables are important to development: tubewells provide (often safer) drinking
water, while improved irrigation has led to substantial increases in output, and decline
in output variability. Strikingly, while agricultural credit in villages whose branches were
nationalized more than doubled over the period 1980 to 1990, relative to villages with
private branches, there was no improvement in either of these measures. The results in
Table 8 indicate that nationalization had no e⁄ect on the likelihood that a town possesses
a tubewell, nor on the share of land under irrigation. The estimates are not as precise
as the employment and credit market results, but do rule out substantial impacts: for
example, nationalization, which more than doubled agricultural credit, did not a⁄ect the
probability of having a tubewell by more than 16 percent, or the share of land irrigated
by more than 20 percent.
The evidence presented here paints a discouraging picture for proponents of govern-
ment ownership of banks. While nationalization initially spurred ￿nancial development,
26and caused unprecedented amounts of credit to ￿ ow to agriculture, this came at a cost
of lower quality intermediation. Moreover, a more than doubling of agricultural credit
to villages led to no measurable increase in agricultural investment. Even the increase in
credit was not sustained, as ￿nancial development was much slower in nationalized areas
in the 1990s. Perhaps the most compelling evidence against the development view of
government ownership of banks is its apparent deleterious e⁄ect on employment in trade
and service industries: along with manufacturing, these are the industries most associated
with ￿nancial development and growth.
5 Conclusion
Finding compelling answers to the question of what determines ￿nancial development, and
how ￿nancial development a⁄ects real outcomes, is di¢ cult. Cross-country regressions
suggest plausible relationships, but may not provide evidence of causal relationships.
Studies that examine bank behavior identify features of government ownership of banks,
but may not capture general equilibrium e⁄ects. This paper uses a policy experiment
in India that induced variation in bank ownership across credit markets. This variation
provides credible estimates of the e⁄ect of government ownership of banks on ￿nancial
development and real outcomes.
The identi￿cation is valid if the marginal nationalized banks are no di⁄erent from
marginal non-nationalized banks, after conditioning on size. I test this identi￿cation
strategy in three ways: ￿rst, I show that, based on balance-sheet characteristics, nation-
alization and non-nationalized banks are similar. Second, I show that nationalized and
non-nationalized banks were growing at similar rates in the decade prior to nationaliza-
tion. Finally, I demonstrate that, at the time of the nationalization, the areas in which
the nationalized bank branches were located were not di⁄erent than the areas in which
the private branches were located.
A limitation of the study is that the nationalized banks were larger than the non-
27nationalized banks. While I include size controls, and standard errors are clustered ap-
propriately, it is di¢ cult to control perfectly for size. The study includes 25 banks, located
in 2,443 credit markets in 340 districts.
I show that OLS panel estimates, the standard cross-country technique, may provide
inaccurate estimates. An OLS approach suggests that bank nationalization had no e⁄ect
on lending growth in the decade following nationalization. This contrasts greatly with
estimates from the natural experiment, which show that nationalization led to a 5-10
percent increase in the annual rate of credit growth between 1980 and 1990. This positive
e⁄ect on ￿nancial development was not sustained.
Government ownership did have a lasting e⁄ect on the sectoral allocation of credit,
leading to increased lending to agriculture and rural areas. It also had a substantial e⁄ect
on the price and quality of intermediation: markets with more government-owned banks
had much higher delinquent loan rates, and lower average interest rates.
Finally, I document the e⁄ect that a shock to ￿nancial development has on real out-
comes. By 1990, villages whose branches were nationalized had experienced a doubling
in aggregate credit relative to villages whose branches were not nationalized. Moreover,
a much higher share of this credit went to agriculture. Yet, I observe no increase in agri-
cultural investment in villages whose branches were nationalized. It is certainly possible
that the households receiving the greater amount of credit are better o⁄ (perhaps they
used the money to send their children to school, or purchase medicine). But this increased
lending did not a⁄ect agricultural investment, and increased the share of non-performing
loans substantially.
These results complement Burgess and Pande (2005), which ￿nds that rural branch ex-
pansion signi￿cantly reduced rural poverty, while aiding the diversi￿cation of the economy.
Rural branches, particularly those owned by the government, lent substantial amounts.
Yet, the ￿ndings here suggest that it was not necessary to open government-owned bank
branches in rural areas. Had the government imposed the same regulations (requiring ex-
pansion into rural areas, and setting lending targets), without nationalizing banks, rural
28areas may well have achieved the same, or better, outcomes.
I do not ￿nd large e⁄ects of changes in ￿nancial development. La Porta et. al. ￿nd
that moving from 0 percent to 100 percent of banks owned by the government reduces
the annual growth rate by -1.4 percent to -2.4 percent per year, depending on the time
period. If nationalization had led to a 2 percent decline in growth rates in India, it would
suggest that after twenty years, the level of economic activity in villages whose branch
was nationalized should be over 30 percent lower than in villages whose branch was not.
While GDP cannot be measured at the village level, the measured e⁄ect of nationalization
on change in agricultural employment (which is closely correlated with economic growth)
is not consistent with very large e⁄ects. One important reason is that the results in
this paper include district ￿xed-e⁄ects, which control for any unobserved heterogeneity
between districts: such an approach is not possible using cross-country variation. I do ￿nd
some e⁄ects on employment in trade and industry in 1991, suggesting that government
ownership of banks did hinder growth in sectors important to economic development.
The ￿nal analysis thus rejects a development view of government ownership of banks.
Government ownership initially increased the quantity, and substantially lowered the qual-
ity, of ￿nancial intermediation. An enormous increase in credit to agriculture had no
measurable e⁄ects on agricultural investment. Looking to the future, these results sug-
gest that while the global trend towards privatizing government-owned banks will lead
to reduced ￿social￿lending, this may come at little or no cost to the bene￿ciary sectors.
The quality of ￿nancial intermediation should improve. But the real e⁄ects may be much
more modest than those suggested by cross-country regressions.
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31Notes
1Tandon (1989, p. 198).
2Banks were allowed to report loans smaller than Rs. 25,000 (ca. $625) in an aggregated fashion until
1999, at which point loans below Rs. 200,000 (ca. $5,000) were reported as aggregates.
3This point is developed in greater detail in section 3.2.
4The choice of how many banks to designate as marginal is a trade-o⁄: a larger set gives more statistical
power, but renders the largest and smallest banks more dissimilar. Robustness checks available from the
author show that results presented here hold when di⁄erent sets of banks as denoted ￿marginal.￿(e.g.,
all six nationalized banks, or the four smallest, etc.) These results are available from the author.
5These results are robust to using a second- or third-degree polynomial, or a bank ￿xed e⁄ect.
6The identi￿cation strategy here is in the spirit of regression discontinuity, but does not match the
standard case, because the number of banks above and below the cuto⁄ is not large.
7The point estimate of a regression of deposits in 1980 on a dummy for nationalization is .109, with
a standard error of .074. Appendix Table A2 performs the same test for credit, and ￿nds no statistically
signi￿cant di⁄erence.
8An alternative approach observes the following: MargNatc=MargSharec*NatFractionc, where Nat-
Fraction is the fraction of marginal branches that were nationalized in credit market c. This alternative
approach controls for smooth (quadratic) functions of both MargSharec and NatFractionc: The e⁄ect of
nationalization is identi￿ed by the interaction MargSharec￿NatFractionc: Results from this speci￿cation
generally match those from equation (5), and are available from the author.
9Recall that the constant serves as the omitted category of large public banks. Thus, the coe¢ cient
on the constant should be one. Small banks were not nationalized; the presence of these in a district
reduces the share of credit by public sector banks: thus ￿s should be -1. Similarly, ￿l should be zero,
since shifting a bank branch from the omitted category to large public will not a⁄ect the share of credit
from nationalized banks. Finally, ￿m will be 1, while ￿ will be -1.
10Census data are available electronically only from 1991. The paper volumes, from which the 1981
data were collected, are not available together in one location. Moreover, it is often di¢ cult to match
321991 towns to 1981. The data were collected from the paper volumes located at the Library of Congress,
Harvard University￿ s Library, and the New York Public Library.
11Against this hypothesis is evidence from Banerjee and Du￿ o (2004), which found that a public sector
bank passed up many pro￿table lending opportunities in the 1990s.
12Matching was di¢ cult for several reasons: town, village, districts and states changed names and
borders frequently between 1981 and 2001; the transliteration of names varies; and village names were
sometimes repeated within a state (and sometimes a district).
The 1981 census is available only in paper format, consisting of several hundred volumes. Approx-
imately 90% of the required volumes were available at the Library of Congress, with the balance found
at Harvard University￿ s Lamont Library and the New York City Public Library.
13Larger credit markets, and those containing public sector banks were slightly more likely to be
matched, though these relationships do not hold once one conditions on the district in which the branch
was located. Due to di¢ culty in locating paper volumes, only 10% of the markets in Kerela were matched.
14The census also contains other measures that may be correlated with well-being, such as literacy
rates and share of the population between 0-6 years. There was no relationship between these variables
and nationalization.
15Analysis of agricultural investment is limited to villages with one branch only in 1981, as an insu¢ cient
number of multi-branch credit markets could be matched to the village abstract dataset.
33Note: Figure 1 gives the size (in terms of aggregate log deposits, as of 1979) of all scheduled commercial banks in India. The six 
banks highlighted in black were nationalized in 1980. The banks with a larger deposit base (to the right) were nationalized in 1969 
or earlier, while the banks with a lower deposit base (to the left) were private and remained private following 1980.




























































5 6 7 8 9 10
















5 6 7 8 9 10
Log Branch Deposits, 1980
Branch Remained Private
Figure 2: Log Deposits in 1981 of Single-Branch Credit MarketsP-Value of Tests of Difference including control polynomial:
Nationalized Private No Control Linear Quadratic Cubic
Deposits 3,689,719 732,360 0.00
# of Branches 420 148 0.00 0.48 0.78 0.78
Profits 4828 1135 0.00 0.66 0.64 0.65
Deposits / Branch 8864 5301 0.00 0.30 0.72 0.73
Return on Equity 0.0014 0.0017 0.44 0.60 0.57 0.58
Sample Size 5 18
Note: Table I compares variables from the balance sheets of banks that were close to the nationalization cut-off. Columns 
(1) and (2) give the means for the group that was nationalized and the group that was not, while columns (3), (4), (5), and 
(6) give the p-value of a test of the hypothesis that the difference in means is zero. (The p-value from the hypothesis β=0, 
from equation 1 in the paper, is given). Columns (4), (5), and (6) include a linear, quadratic, and cubic (respectively) 
polynomial in log bank size.
Mean
Table I: Comparison of Nationalized and Non-Nationalized Banks Prior to Nationalization
Banks Close to the Cut-OffPanel A: Controlling for Bank Size
Small Marginal
Marginal* 
Nationalized Large Small Marginal
Marginal* 
Nationalized Large
1970s 0.19 *** 0.20 ** 0.05 0.19 * 0.14 ** 0.16 * 0.05 0.16
(0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.11)
1980s -0.03 -0.06 *** -0.04 -0.06 *** 0.00 -0.05 *** -0.03 -0.04 ***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00)
1990s 0.02 -0.02 -0.08 * -0.05 *** 0.03 -0.01 -0.09 ** -0.07 ***
(0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00)
Panel B: Controlling for Bank Size * Decade
Small Marginal
Marginal* 
Nationalized Large Small Marginal
Marginal* 
Nationalized Large
1970s 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.05
(0.13) (0.19) (0.04) (0.24) (0.13) (0.18) (0.04) (0.23)
1980s 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.19
(0.14) (0.19) (0.05) (0.25) (0.13) (0.18) (0.04) (0.22)
1990s 0.24 * 0.28 -0.01 0.33 0.25 0.29 -0.02 0.31
(0.13) (0.17) (0.05) (0.22) (0.17) (0.23) (0.06) (0.29)
Note: Table II compares the growth rate of deposits and credit, at the bank level, for several groupings of banks. "Small" banks were never large enough to be eligible for 
nationalization; "marginal" banks include those that were just above or below the cutoff for nationalization. "Marginal*Nationalized" banks were those marginal banks that were 
nationalized. Finally "Large" indicates the largest private bank that was nationalized in 1980.
Each panel reports results from two regressions, one for deposit growth, and one for credit growth. Columns (1), (2), and (4) of the first line (1970s) give the average growth rate for the 
small , marginal, and large groups in the 1970s. The second line gives the differential growth rate (relative to the 1970s) for the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, column (3) gives the 
differential growth rate between marginal non-nationalized and marginal nationalized. Panel A includes a linear control for log deposits as of 1980, while panel B includes a linear 
control for deposits as of 1980 interacted with three decade dummies (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s).



















Share of Branches, Marginal & Nationalized Parent 1.00 ***
(0.01)
Share of Branches, Marginal Parent -0.90 ***
(0.03)
Share of Branches, Small Parent -0.76 ***
(0.14)
Share of Branches, Large Parent -0.16 **
(0.07)





All regressions include district fixed effects and a cubic polynomial in the log level of deposits in the credit market in 1980.




Notes: The dependent variable is share of credit issued by public banks in 1992. The unit of observation is the credit market. 
Each column represents a regression. 
Column (1) presents results from a regression for villages that had one marginal private bank prior to the 1980 
nationalization. A marginal bank was one whose size placed it just above, or just below, the cutoff line for nationalization. 
The independent variable of interest is a dummy for whether the branch was nationalized. Control variables include a cubic 
polynomial in the log size of the parent bank of the branch as of 1980.
Column (2) presents the results for all towns that had at least one marginal private bank in 1980. The independent variable of 
interest is share of branches in the credit market that were both marginal and nationalized. Control variables are: the average 
size of the parent banks of marginal branches, the share of branches whose parents belonged to large banks, share of 
branches whose parents belonged to medium banks, and share of branches whose parents belonged to small banks. Table IV: Bank Nationalization and Financial Development
Panel A: 1980-2000
OLS OLS
Control for Size Control for Size
(3) (6)
Nationalized -0.01 *** 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.03
(0.002) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02)
Parent Size -2.31 * -1.08
(1.39) (2.10)
Parent Size
2 0.17 * 0.08
(0.10) (0.15)
Parent Size
3 0.00 * 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Marginal & Nationalized 0.00 0.01 **
(0.00) (0.01)
Share Marginal -0.02 ** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Share Small 0.01 0.04 *
(0.01) (0.02)
Share Large -0.04 ** 0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Ave. Size of Marginal 0.00 -0.01 **
(0.00) (0.01)
R
2 0.39 0.57 0.48 0.26 0.43 0.28









All regressions include district fixed effects.
Columns (1) and (4) report OLS regressions of growth in deposits or credit on the share of bank branches that were government-owned in the 
credit market as of 1980.
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of deposits or credit. The unit of observation is the credit market. Each column 
represents a regression. 
Columns (3) and (6) present the results for all towns that had at least one marginal private bank in 1980. Control variables include share of 
branches whose parents belonged to large banks, share of branches whose parents belonged to medium banks, and share of branches whose 
parents belonged to small banks, (share belonging to already nationalized banks is the omitted category), as well as a cubic polynomial in 1980 
deposits at the credit market level. 
Columns (2) and (5) present results from a regression for villages that had one marginal private bank prior to the 1980 nationalization. A 
marginal bank was one whose size placed it just above, or just below, the cutoff line for nationalization. The independent variable of interest is 
a dummy for whether the branch was nationalized. Control variables include a cubic polynomial in the log size of the parent bank of the 
branch as of 1980, and a cubic polynomial in deposits as of 1980.Panel B: 1980s
OLS OLS
Control for Size Control for Size
(3) (6)
Nationalized 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.11 ***
(0.004) (0.02) (0.005) (0.03)
Parent Size -4.79 ** -1.85
(2.06) (3.25)
Parent Size
2 0.35 ** 0.15
(0.15) (0.24)
Parent Size
3 -0.01 ** 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
Marginal & Nationalized 0.02 ** 0.05 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Share Marginal -0.06 *** -0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Share Small -0.03 ** 0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Share Large -0.08 *** 0.08 **
(0.03) (0.03)
Ave. Size of Marginal 0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
R
2 0.39 0.54 0.44 0.26 0.43 0.33
N 11918 1513 2443 11837 1512 2442
Panel C: 1990s
OLS OLS
Control for Size Control for Size
(3) (6)
Nationalized -0.03 *** -0.01 -0.03 *** -0.04
(0.003) (0.02) (0.004) (0.03)








Marginal & Nationalized -0.01 * -0.02 *
(0.01) (0.01)
Share Marginal 0.02 ** 0.04 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Share Small 0.06 * 0.07
(0.03) (0.04)
Share Large -0.03 -0.06
(0.03) (0.04)
Ave. Size of Marginal -0.01 ** -0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
R
2 0.27 0.48 0.37 0.18 0.35 0.28










Table IV, Continued : Bank Nationalization and Financial Development


































Notes: The dependent variable is agricultural or rural credit in 1992. The unit of
observation is the credit market. Each cell represents a regression. The independent
variable of interest, whose coefficient is reported in the table, is the share of bank
branches in a credit market nationalized in 1980.
Column (1) presents results from a regression for villages that had one bank branch,
which was "marginal," prior to the 1980 nationalization. Column (2) presents the
results for all branches that had a least one marginal branch in 1980.







Average Market Interest Rate
Interest Rate, 1992 0.007 -0.001
(0.006) (0.002)
N 1507 2437
Interest Rate, 2000 -0.017 *** -0.017 ***
(0.006) (0.002)
N 1448 2393
Share of Credit in Arrears, 1992
Non-Agricultural 0.038 0.042 *
0.034 0.022
1223 1908
Agricultural Credit 0.185 *** 0.067 **
0.046 0.028
857 1533
Notes: Table VI reports the effect of nationalization on interest rates, and late loan
repayment, in credit markets in India. The notes to Table V provide details of the
regressions.
Table VI: Interest Rate and Quality of Intermediation
One-Branch
Towns
(1)Panel A: Share of Employment in Agricultural Labor, Cultivators, and Small-Scale Industry
One-Branch One-Branch One-Branch
Levels
1981 Nationalization -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.00
(0.07) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
1991 Nationalization 0.02 * 0.03 ** 0.00 0.04 ** 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
2001 Nationalization 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Changes
1981-1991 Nationalization 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.01
(0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
1991-2001 Nationalization 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
1981-2001 Nationalization 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.01
(0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Panel B: Share of Employment in Industrial, Trade, and Services
One-Branch One-Branch One-Branch
Levels 0.01 -0.02 ** -0.01 -0.04 *** 0.00 0.00
1991 Nationalization (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Notes: Each cell represents a regression, and reports the estimated effect of bank nationalization on the dependent variable. The dependent variables are the share of
the population involved in each employment sector, for the time period given at the left of the table. The unit of observation is the credit market. 
The columns labeled "One-Branch" present the specification that includes all villages that had one bank branch, whose parent bank was close to the 1980
nationalization cut-off. The dependent variable whose coefficient is reported is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the branch in that village is nationalized,
and zero if the branch remains part of a private bank. The columns labeled "Control for Size" present results for all villages and towns in India that had at least one
marginal branch. The coefficient reported is on the share of bank branches in that market nationalized in 1980. 
All regressions include district fixed effects and a cubic polynomial in the log level of deposits in the credit market in 1980. Sample sizes are given in the appendix
table.
Control for Size
Table VII: Effect of Bank Nationalization on Employment and Employment Growth
Control for Size Control for Size Control for Size
Control for Size Control for Size
Agricultural Labor Cultivators Small-Scale Industry















Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy of whether the town has a tubewell or
the fraction of land irrigated in 1991. The unit of observation is the credit market.
Each column represents a regression. 
Each column presents results from a regression for villages that had one marginal
private bank prior to the 1980 nationalization. A marginal bank was one whose
size placed it just above, or just below, the cutoff line for nationalization. The
independent variable of interest is a dummy for whether the branch was
nationalized. Control variables include a cubic polynomial in the log size of the
parent bank of the branch as of 1980.
All regressions include district fixed effects and a cubic polynomial in the log
level of deposits in the credit market in 1980.









(1)Appendix Table I: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev N
Panel A: Bank Growth
Annual Change in Log Credit (Nominal) 0.19 0.10 978
Annual Change in Log Deposits (Nominal) 0.18 0.12 978
One-Branch Credit Markets All Credit Markets
Panel B: Credit Market and Real Outcomes Mean Std. Dev N Mean Std. Dev N
Dependent Variables
Share of Credit from Public Branches, 1992 0.49 0.49 1513 0.60 0.43 2443
Deposit Growth, 1981-2000 0.17 0.04 1513 0.16 0.03 2443
Credit Growth, 1981-2000 0.14 0.05 1513 0.14 0.04 2443
Share of Credit to Agriculture, 1992 0.38 0.23 1513 0.33 0.22 2443
Share of Credit to Rural Areas, 1992 0.86 0.34 1513 0.55 0.50 2443
Share of Credit to Small Scale Industry, 1992 0.06 0.09 1513 0.09 0.10 2443
Share of Credit to Industry, 1992 0.07 0.12 1513 0.14 0.17 2443
Share of Credit to Trade, 1992 0.09 0.09 1513 0.10 0.08 2443
Share of Credit to Services, 1992 0.05 0.06 1513 0.05 0.06 2443
Interest Rate, 1992 0.00 0.02 1507 0.00 0.02 2437
Interest Rate, 2000 0.01 0.01 1448 0.01 0.03 2393
Share of Non-Agricultural Credit Late, 1992 0.09 0.16 1223 0.10 0.14 1908
Share of Agricultural Credit Late, 1992 0.10 0.21 857 0.12 0.20 1533
Independent Variables
Nationalized 0.47 0.50 1513
Averge Size of Parent Branch 14.90 0.80 1513
Share of Branches, Marginal & Nationalized Parent 0.27 0.41 2443
Share of Branches, Marginal Parent 0.71 0.34 2443
Share of Branches, Small Parent 0.00 0.03 2443
Share of Branches, Large Parent 0.00 0.03 2443
Ave. Size of Marginal Parent Bank 13.90 0.98 2443
Panel C: Employment and Employment Growth One-Branch Credit Markets All Credit Markets
Mean Std. Dev N Mean Std. Dev N
Share of Population Employed in:
1981 Agricultural Labor 0.23 0.16 652 0.13 0.13 1067
1981 Cultivation 0.25 0.14 656 0.15 0.15 1075
1981 Small Scale Industry 0.04 0.06 648 0.03 0.05 1067
1991 Agricultural Labor 0.15 0.08 888 0.10 0.08 1402
1991 Cultivation 0.17 0.10 888 0.11 0.10 1402
1991 Small Scale Industry 0.01 0.02 888 0.01 0.02 1402
1991 Industry 0.05 0.04 888 0.07 0.05 1402
1991 Trade 0.05 0.03 888 0.08 0.05 1402
1991 Service 0.06 0.03 888 0.08 0.05 1402
2001 Agricultural Labor 0.16 0.16 1058 0.09 0.12 1804
2001 Cultivation 0.16 0.13 1058 0.09 0.12 1804
2001 Small Scale Industry 0.02 0.03 1058 0.02 0.03 1804
Panel D: Agricultural Investment One-Branch Credit Markets
Mean Std. Dev N
1991 Share of Towns with Tubewell 0.31 0.46 701
1991 Fraction of Land Irrigated 0.44 0.39 636One-Branch Towns All Towns/Villages
(1) (2)
Panel A: Without Size Controls




Panel B: Falsification Exercise




















Notes: This table tests whether the share of marginal banks nationalized was correlated with credit
market or labor conditions in 1981. Panel is an OLS regression of the log amount of credit in 1981 on
the share of marginal branches nationalized, and includes only district fixed effects as controls. Panel
B uses the identification strategy described in the text to conduct a falsification exercise.
Column (1) presents results from a regression for villages that had one bank branch, which was
"marginal," prior to the 1980 nationalization. Column (2) presents the results for all branches that had
a least one marginal branch in 1980.
Appendix Table II: Test of Identification Assumptions